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  We  consider  a  simple  model  of  stochastic  evolution  in 
population  games.    In  our  model,  each  agent  occasionally 
receives opportunities to update his choice of strategy.  When 
such an opportunity arises, the agent selects a strategy that is 
currently  optimal,  but  only  after  his  payoffs  have  been 
randomly  perturbed.    We  prove  that  the  resulting 
evolutionary  process  converges  to  approximate  Nash 
equilibrium in both the medium run and the long run in three 
general classes of population games:  stable games, potential 
games,  and  supermodular  games.    We  conclude  by 
contrasting  the  evolutionary  process  studied  here  with 
stochastic  fictitious  play.    Journal  of  Economic  Literature 
Classification Numbers:  C72, C73. 
  Keywords:    evolutionary  game  theory,  convergence  to 
approximate Nash equilibrium, equilibrium selection. 
 
 





1.  Introduction 
 
   Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of noncooperative game theory.  Nevertheless, 
the traditional theoretical justifications for predicting Nash equilibrium play, which are 
based on assumptions about the players’ rationality and equilibrium knowledge, are 
not  always  convincing,  since  in  many  applications  these  assumptions  seem 
unreasonably  demanding.    Because  the  strength  of  the  equilibrium  knowledge 
assumption increases as the number of players grows, the traditional justification of 
equilibrium behavior seems particularly questionable when the number of players is 
large. 
   Fortunately,  the  existence  of  large  numbers  of  players  enables  us  to  consider 
alternative approaches to justifying the Nash prediction, in particular if the game is 
played repeatedly over time.  In this situation, it is natural to introduce a model in 
which  players  only  occasionally  consider  revising  their  behavior,  utilizing  simple 
myopic decision rules when revision opportunities arise.
1  With such a model in hand, 
one  can  attempt  to  justify  the  Nash  prediction  by  showing  that  the  resulting 
evolutionary process leads to equilibrium play. 
   In  this  paper,  we  study  evolution  in  population  games:    games  played  by large 
numbers  of  agents  whose  payoff  functions  are  continuously  differentiable  in  the 
proportions of agents choosing each strategy.  While this class of games includes the 
standard model of random matching in normal form games as a special case, it also 
allows one to capture nonlinearities in payoffs that arise in many applications. 
   Our  model  of  evolution  is  quite  simple.    Each  player  occasionally  receives 
opportunities to revise his choice of strategy.  When such an opportunity arises, the 
player chooses a best response to the current population state.  However, this choice is 
made only after the player’s payoffs are randomly perturbed, with these perturbations 
occurring independently at each revision opportunity.  These payoff perturbations are 
analogous to those introduced by Harsanyi [19] in his model of purification of mixed 
equilibrium:  in both his model and in ours, players have a unique best response after 
almost every realization of payoffs. 
   Our  main  goal  in  this  paper  is  to  determine  conditions  under  which  this 
evolutionary process generates approximate Nash equilibrium play.  We consider two 
notions of convergence:  convergence in the medium run, which concerns the behavior of 
the population over long but finite time spans, and convergence in the long run, which 
                                                 
1    While in some contexts myopia is untenable hypothesis, here inertia in opponents’ behavior and the 
anonymity of individual agents render this assumption quite reasonable. –2– 
concerns its behavior over the infinite time horizon.  We establish that evolution leads 
to equilibrium behavior under both notions of convergence for three general classes of 
games:  stable games (Sandholm [37]), potential games, and supermodular games.  Our 
convergence results do not depend on the distributions of the payoff perturbations, and, 
unlike many convergence results in the evolutionary literature, require no restrictions 
on the number of strategies in the underlying game. 
   To  begin  our  analysis,  we  associate  with  our  stochastic  evolutionary  process  an 
ordinary  differential  equation  that  describes  the  process’  expected  motion.    This 
equation, the perturbed best response dynamic, is a smoothly perturbed version of the best 
response  dynamic  of  Gilboa  and  Matsui  [18];  its  rest  points  are  approximate  Nash 
equilibria of the underlying game.  Building on the work of Hofbauer [22], Hofbauer 
and Hopkins [24], and Hofbauer and Sandholm [25] for random matching settings, we 
establish  stability  properties  for  the  perturbed  best  response  dynamic  in  the  three 
classes of population games noted above.  We then establish convergence results for the 
original  stochastic  process  by  relying  on  a  variety  of  approximation  theorems:    our 
medium  run  convergence  theorems  use  results  on  the  convergence  of  sequences  of 
Markov  processes  (Kurtz  [30]),  while  our  long  run  convergence  theorems  utilize 
techniques from stochastic approximation theory (Benaïm [2], Benaïm and Hirsch [6]). 
   A  number  of  authors  have  obtained  convergence  results  for  unperturbed  best 
response  dynamics  in  normal  form  games.    In  stochastic,  finite  player  frameworks, 
Monderer and Shapley [32] prove convergence to Nash equilibrium in potential games, 
while  Kandori  and  Rob  [28]  establish  convergence  to  equilibrium  in  supermodular 
games.  In the deterministic, continuum of player framework of Gilboa and Matsui [18], 
Hofbauer [21, 22] proves convergence to equilibrium in zero sum games, games with an 
interior ESS, and potential games.   
   There are a variety of reasons to focus instead on perturbed best response dynamics.  
For one, the unperturbed dynamics require an extreme sensitivity of players’ choices to 
the exact value of the population state.  This sensitivity manifests itself in the fact that 
Gilboa and Matsui’s [18] dynamic defines not a continuous differential equation, but 
rather  a  discontinuous  differential  inclusion.    In  contrast,  perturbed  best  responses 
change smoothly in the population state, and so generate well-behaved deterministic 
dynamics.    Moreover,  unlike  its  counterpart  for  the  unperturbed  dynamic,  the 
stochastic  process  underlying  the  perturbed  best  response  dynamic  is  ergodic,  with 
long run behavior described by a unique stationary distribution.  Ergodicity simplifies 
our  long  run  analysis,  and  also  introduces  the  possibility  of  establishing  strong 
equilibrium selection results, in the spirit of those proved by Foster and Young [16], –3– 
Young [43], Kandori, Mailath, and Rob [27], Kandori and Rob [28], Blume [9, 10], and 
especially Benaïm and Weibull [7]. 
   In an earlier paper (Hofbauer and Sandholm [25]), we obtained convergence results 
for the learning process known as stochastic fictitious play (Fudenberg and Kreps [17]).  
In stochastic fictitious play, a group of n players repeatedly play an n player normal 
form game.  During each discrete time period, each player plays a best response to the 
time average of his opponents’ play, but only after his payoffs have been struck by 
random perturbations.  Like those of the evolutionary process studied here, the limiting 
properties of stochastic fictitious play can be characterized in terms of the perturbed 
best response dynamic.  But there are other respects in which the two processes are 
fundamentally different:  the two processes are specified in terms of distinct types of 
state  variable,  and  different  limiting  operations  are  employed  in  order  to  obtain 
convergence  results.    Furthermore,  while  our  work  on  stochastic  fictitious  play 
concerned learning in normal form games, the present paper establishes convergence 
results  in  the  more  general  context  of  population  games.    Inter  alia,  this  broader 
framework enables us to establish global convergence to a unique equilibrium in all 
stable games, a class of games containing many examples of economic interest that fall 
outside the random matching framework.  We discuss all of these issues in considerable 
detail in the final section of the paper. 
   Section 2 introduces our strategic framework and our model of stochastic evolution.  
Sections 3 analyzes the perturbed best response dynamics in stable games, potential 
games, and supermodular games.  Section 4 contains our results on convergence in the 
medium  run  and  convergence  in  the  long  run.    Section  5  concludes  by  contrasting 
stochastic  evolution  with  stochastic  fictitious  play.    All  proofs  are  relegated  to  the 
Appendix. 
 
2.  The Model 
 
2.1  Population Games 
 
  We begin by defining population games with continuous player sets.  Let P = {1, ... , 
   p } be a set of    p  populations, where    p  ≥ 1.  Population p is of mass    m
p, and the total 
mass of all populations is m = 
     
m
p
p!P " ; for convenience, we assume that each    m
p is an 
integer. 
   Members of population p choose strategies from the set    S
p = {1, ... ,    n
p }, so the total 
number of pure strategies in all populations is n = 
     
n
p
p!P " .  We let    !
p  = {   x
p ∈       R+
n
p
:  –4– 
   xi
p
i!S
p "  = 1} denote the set of probability distributions over strategies in    S
p.  The set of 
strategy distributions for population p is denoted    X
p =    m
p   !
p  = {   x
p ∈       R+
n
p
:     xi
p
i!S
p "  = 
   m
p}, while X = {x = (      x
1, ... ,    x
p ) ∈       R+
n:     x
p ∈    X
p} is the set of overall strategy distributions.  
While the population's aggregate behavior is always described by a point in X, it is 
useful to define payoffs on the set    X  = {x ∈       R+
n:     m
p – ε ≤    xi
p
i !  ≤    m
p + ε  ∀ p ∈ P}, 
where ε is a positive constant.  This set contains the strategy distributions that arise if 
the populations' masses vary slightly.  Defining payoffs on this set is useful because it 
enables us to speak directly about a player's marginal impact on his opponents' payoffs, 
but is not essential to our analysis. 
  The payoff function for strategy i ∈    S
p is denoted    F i
p :    X  → R, and is assumed to be 
continuously differentiable.  Note that the payoffs to a strategy in population p can 
depend on the strategy distribution within population p itself.  We let    F




refer to the vector of payoff functions for strategies belonging to population p, and we 
identify a population game with its payoff vector field F:    X  →       R
n. 
   We  now  introduce  some  examples  of  population  games  that  we  will  revisit 
throughout the paper.   
   Random matching in normal form games.  Suppose that a single unit mass population of 
players is randomly matched to play a symmetric normal form game with payoff matrix 
A ∈       R
n!n, where Aij is the payoff a player obtains if he plays i and his opponent plays j.  
Then the payoffs for the corresponding population game are F(x) = Ax. 
   Alternatively, suppose that members of two unit mass populations are paired to 
play a normal form game with bimatrix (A, B) ∈          R
n
1!n2
 ×          R
n
1!n2
.  If two matched players 
play strategies i ∈       S
1 and j ∈       S
2, they obtain payoffs of Aij and Bij, respectively.  The 
corresponding population game has payoffs 
 
       F(      x
1,       x
2) = 
     
0 A
!  B  0
" 
# 












   Because  of  the  linearity  of  the  expectation  operator,  random  matching  yields 
population games with linear or multilinear payoffs, and in which a player's payoffs do 
not  depend  on  the  behavior  of  other  members  of  his  population  (when     p   ≥  2).  
Population games that are not based on random matching need not possess either of 
these properties.  Our next class of examples provides a case in point. 
  Congestion games:  Congestion games are a natural tool for modeling externalities, 
such as those arising in traffic networks (see Sandholm [35, 38]).  In a congestion game, –5– 
each strategy i ∈    S
p requires the use of some finite collection of facilities    !i
p ! Φ.  In 
traffic network models, each facility represents a link in the network, and each strategy 
corresponds to a path (i.e., a collection of links) connecting an origin/destination pair.  
In general, the set of facilities is simply an arbitrary finite set; in particular, there is no 
need to assume that a network structure on Φ exists. 
   Each facility φ has a cost function cφ: R+ → R that describes the penalty (delay) from 
using the facility.  The cost of facility φ is a function of its utilization uφ, the total mass of 
the players who use the facility: 
 
            u!(x) =





p!P $ ,  where    !
p(φ) = {i ∈    S
p:  φ ∈    !i
p}. 
 
The congestion game is defined by the payoff functions 
 
         Fi
p (x) = –




p $ . 
 
In settings like traffic networks involving negative externalities, the cost functions cφ are 
increasing;  positive  externalities  lead  to  decreasing  cost  functions.    Payoffs  in 
congestion games depend on own-population behavior, and need only be linear if the 
underlying cost functions are linear themselves. 
 
2.2  Evolution with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs 
 
    We  now  introduce  our  model  of  evolution  with  randomly  disturbed  payoffs.  
Models of this sort were first considered by Blume [9, 10] and Young [44] in a random 
matching  setting  under  a  specific  parametric  assumption  on  the  disturbance 
distributions.    Here  we  consider  evolution  in  general  population  games,  and  place 
virtually no restrictions on the form that payoff disturbances take.
2   
   Members  of     p   finite  populations  of  sizes  (N      m
1,  …  ,  N   m
p )  recurrently  play  the 
population game F.  Players occasionally receive opportunities to switch strategies, with 
each player’s opportunities arriving via independent, rate 1 Poisson processes.  When a 
player  from  population  p  receives  a  revision  opportunity,  he  evaluates  the  current 
expected payoff to each of his pure strategies, but his assessments are subject to random 
shocks that follow a given probability distribution    !
p  on       R
n
p
.  The player selects the 
strategy that he evaluates as best. 
                                                 
2    Blume and Young restrict attention to evolution under the logit choice rule, which we describe below.  
These authors also analyze models of local interaction, which we do not consider here. –6– 
   Although  payoff  and  choice  shocks  drawn  at  random  in  each  period  are  now 
common  features  of  evolutionary  models,  it  is  worthwhile  to  provide  a  direct 
justification  for  their  use.    Following  Harsanyi  [19],  we  can  understand  the  payoff 
shocks as representing small, random influences on behavior; in this case, we consider 
distributions    !
p  that place nearly all of their mass in a neighborhood of the  origin.  
Large payoff shocks may be a more natural assumption, for example, in cases where 
preferences for variety are at least as strong as the preferences described by the payoffs 
of the underlying game.  Of course, one can also take a middle course, under which 
payoff shocks are typically quite small but occasionally rather large, so that the more 
significant shocks only occur infrequently and irregularly. 
  Aggregate behavior in this model is described by a continuous time Markov chain 
      {Xt
N}t!0, which takes values in the state space       X
N = {x ∈ X:  Nx ∈       Z
n}.  The initial 
condition       X0
N  is arbitrary.  Let    !k denote the random time at which the kth revision 
opportunity arises.  For a switch from strategy i ∈    S
p to strategy j ∈    S
p to occur during 
this  opportunity,  the  player  granted  the revision  opportunity  must  be  a  member  of 
population p who is playing strategy i, and the realization of his payoff disturbance 
must render strategy j his best response.  Transitions of    Xt
N  are therefore described by 
 
     
     
P X!r+1













p = j) 
 
for i ≠ j, where    ei
p and    ej
p are standard basis vectors.  With the remaining probability of 









i#Sp $ p#P $ ,  no change in the state occurs. 
   To  analyze  this  process,  we  introduce  the  notion  of  a  perturbed  best  response 
function.  To begin, define the choice probability function    C
p:       R
n
p
 →    !
p  by 
 
(1)            Ci
p(!
p) = 
     
!
p "
p : i #argmaxj#Sp $ j
p + " j
p ( ). 
 
If  a  player  currently  faces  a  base  payoff  vector  of     !
p ,  then        Ci
p(!
p)  represents  the 
probability that the realized payoff perturbation leads him to choose strategy i.  When 
   !
p  places most of its mass near the origin, then    C
p(   !
p ) puts most of its mass on the 
maximizer of    !
p , but places positive mass on all elements of    S
p. 
   Our  regularity  condition  on  perturbation distributions  is defined in  terms  of  the 
function    C
p.  We call    !
p  an admissible distribution if it admits a strictly positive density –7– 
on       R
n
p
 and is smooth enough that    C
p is continuously differentiable.  The profile ν = (   !
1, 
… ,    !
p ) is admissible if each of its components is admissible.
3 
    Now let F be a population game, and let ν be a profile of admissible distributions.  
We define the perturbed best response function        ˜  B 
p: X →    !
p  for the pair (F, ν) by the 
composition       ˜  B 
p =       C
p ! F
p . 
   With this definition in hand, we can express the transition rule above as follows: 
 
     
     
P X!r+1













p = j) 






        =      
1
m xi
p ˜  B  j
p(x) 
 
The  expected  increment  in     Xt
N   during  a  single  revision  opportunity  is  therefore 
described by 
 
     




N = x ( )  = 











p ˜  B  j
p(x) 
                    = 
     
1
Nm ej


















                    = 
     
1
Nm m
p ˜  B 
p(x)! x
p ( ) 
 
Since each of the Nm players’ revision opportunities arrive according to independent 
rate 1 Poisson processes, the revision opportunities arriving in the society as a whole are 
described by the sum of these processes, which is a Poisson process with rate Nm.  We 
therefore multiply the expression above by Nm to obtain the expected increment in    Xt
N  
per unit of time.  Writing the result as a differential equation, we obtain 
 
(P)            ˙  x 
p =    m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) –    x
p  for all p ∈ P. 
 
We call this equation the perturbed best response dynamic for the pair (F, ν). 
   We call x ∈ X a perturbed equilibrium for (F, ν) if it is a fixed point of (      m
1
      ˜  B 
1(x), … , 
   m
p 
      ˜  B 
p (x)), or, equivalently, if it is a rest point of (P).  We let PE(F, ν) denote the set of 
                                                 
3    The assumption that ν
p has full support on R
n is stronger than necessary.  Once we fix a game F, we 
can compute a finite bound    MF
p
 on the difference between the payoffs generated by any pair of strategies 
in S
p at any state in X.  Using this bound, we can construct a smooth distribution       ˆ  ! 
p
 that generates the 
same choice probabilities as ν
p at all payoff vectors feasible under F but whose support is contained in a 
compact set (namely, a cube with sides of length 2n
p
   MF
p
). –8– 
perturbed equilibria.  One can show that if most of the mass in each distribution    !
p  is 
near the origin, then the perturbed equilibria of (F, ν) approximate Nash equilibria of F.
4 
   Our  aim  in  this  paper  is  to  relate  the  behavior  of  the  stochastic  process     Xt
N   to 
solutions of the deterministic dynamic (P).  Our analysis proceeds in three steps.  In the 
following section, we investigate the behavior of the dynamic (P) in three classes of 
games.    In  Section  4.1,  we  combine  the  analysis  of  equation  (P)  with  results  on 
convergence  of  Markov  processes  to  obtain  finite  horizon  convergence  results.    In 
Section 4.2, the deterministic analysis and tools from stochastic approximation theory 
are employed to establish infinite horizon convergence results. 
 
3.  Analysis of the Perturbed Best Response Dynamic 
 
   We  now  introduce  three  classes  of  population  games  for  which  the  behavior  of 
perturbed best response dynamics can be well characterized:  stable games, potential 
games,  and  supermodular  games.    These  characterizations  generalize  results 
established by Hofbauer [22], Hofbauer and Hopkins [24], and Hofbauer and Sandholm 
[25] for random matching games to general population games.  Our results for stable 
games substantially expand the set of games for which the dynamics are known to have 
a globally attracting state. 
   Our results for stable games and potential games rely on a discrete choice theorem 
from Hofbauer and Sandholm [25].  Recall that the choice probability function    C
p from 
equation (1) is defined in terms of admissible stochastic payoff perturbations of the 
payoffs to each pure strategy.  Theorem 2.1 of Hofbauer and Sandholm [25] shows that 
there  is  always  an  alternative  representation  of     C
p  that  relies  on  a  deterministic 
perturbation of the payoffs to each mixed strategy.  
  More specifically, we call the function    V
p: int(   !
p ) → R an admissible deterministic 
perturbation if it is differentiably strictly convex and becomes infinitely steep near the 
boundary of    !
p .  Then if the function    C
p is defined via equation (1) for some admissible 
distribution    !
p , there is an admissible deterministic perturbation    V
p such that 
 
(2)        C
p(   !
p ) = 









p) ( ). 
 
On the other hand, the converse statement is false:  there are choice functions defined 
by admissible deterministic perturbations that admit no stochastic representation. 
                                                 
4    See Proposition 3.1 of Hofbauer and Sandholm [25]. –9– 
   One  can  interpret  the  function     V
p  as  a  "control  cost"  that  is  larger  for  "purer" 
elements of    !
p  (van Damme [41, Ch. 4]).  Thus, the representation theorem shows that 
the  choice  probability  functions  obtained  from  additive  random  utility  models  can 
always be represented using a framework in which mixed strategies are chosen directly, 
but in which this choice is subject to convex control costs.  Further details on this result 
needed for our analysis are provided in the Appendix. 
   The best known example of a choice probability function is the logit choice function, 
 
       Ci(π) = 








By varying the noise level η from zero to infinity, one obtains behavior that varies from 
pure optimization to uniform randomization.  It is well known that logit choice can be 
derived in terms of both stochastic and deterministic perturbations:  equation (1) yields 
logit choice if the stochastic perturbations are i.i.d. with the extreme value distribution 
exp(–exp(–   !
"1x – γ)) (where γ  !  0.5772 is Euler's constant), while equation (2) yields 
logit choice if    V
p is the entropy function    V
p(   y
p ) = 




j " .  The theorem described 
above  shows  that  such  a  dual  representation  is  possible  regardless  of  the  joint 
distribution of the stochastic perturbations. 
 –10– 
3.1  Stable Games 
 
   Let TX = {z ∈       R
n:    zi
p
i!S
p "  = 0 for all p ∈ P} be the set of directions tangent to the set 
of population states X, and for any function f: X → R and direction z ∈ TX, let 
 
      




     
lim
!"0




denote the derivative of f at point x in direction z.  Following Sandholm [37], we say that 
F is a stable game if it satisfies 
 
(SE)   




!z i " p " (x) ≤ 0  for all z ∈ TX and all x ∈ X. 
 
Equivalently, F is stable if it satisfies the negative semidefiniteness condition 
 
       z · DF(x) z ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X and all z ∈ TX. 
 
Condition (SE) is called self-defeating externalities.  It requires that if a small group of 
players  switches  strategies,  then  the  improvements  in  payoffs  of  the  strategies  they 
switch to are exceeded by the improvement in payoffs of the strategies they abandon.  
   When  the  population  game  F  is  defined  via  random  matching,  condition (SE) is 
quite restrictive.  For instance, in the two population random matching framework, it is 
easy to show that F is stable if and only if the underlying normal form game (A, B) is 
equivalent to a zero sum game.  However, if payoffs can depend on own-population 
behavior,  then  condition  (SE)  is  far  less  limiting.    Indeed,  congestion  games  with 
increasing facility costs (e.g., traffic network games) are all stable games, as are concave 
potential games, RL stable games (Cressman, Garay, and Hofbauer [14]), and negative 
diagonal  dominant  games.    For  a  presentation  of  all  of  these  examples  and  further 
discussion of condition (SE), see Sandholm [37]. 
   If F is a stable game, then the set of all Nash equilibria of F is convex (see Hofbauer 
[23]); under a mild additional assumption, the Nash equilibrium of F is unique (see 
Sandholm [37]).  In Theorem 3.1 below, we establish that all perturbed best response 
dynamics for stable games admit a single globally asymptotically stable rest point.   
  The construction we use to prove this result generalizes one introduced by Hofbauer 
[22] in a single population random matching setting.  Consider the function Λ: X → R+ 
defined by 
 –11– 
       Λ(x) = 
        
m
p max
















(  p!P ) , 
 
where    V
p is the deterministic perturbation associated with the distribution    !
p . 
 
Theorem 3.1:  Suppose F is a stable game and that ν is admissible. Then 
   (i)    The  function  Λ  is  a  strict  Lyapunov  function  for  the  dynamic  (P):    its  value 
decreases strictly along every non-constant solution trajectory. 
   (ii)   (F,  ν)  admits  a  unique  and  globally  asymptotically  stable  perturbed  equilibrium, 
which is the lone state at which  Λ(x) = 0. 
 
   Theorem  3.1  shows  that  if  F  is  a  stable  game  and  ν  a  profile  of  admissible 
disturbance  distributions,  then  the  set  of  perturbed  equilibria  PE(F,  ν)  consists  of  a 
single state that is globally asymptotically stable under (P).  To establish this, we first 
show that the positive function Λ is a strict Lyapunov function for (P), and that the 
zeros  of  Λ  are  the  rest  points  of  (P).    We  then  use  the  stability  of  F  and  the  strict 
convexity  of     V
p  to  prove  that  (P)  admits  exactly  one  rest  point.    Together,  these 
assertions  imply  that  there  is  a  unique,  globally  asymptotically  stable  perturbed 
equilibrium of (F, ν). 
   To understand the Lyapunov function Λ, recall that the payoff vector for population 
p at population state x is       F
p(x).  Fix this payoff vector, and suppose that the members of 
population  p  jointly  choose  a  mixed  strategy     y
p   in  an  attempt  to  maximize  the 
difference between the aggregate payoff    y
p  ·       F
p(x) and the control cost       V
p(y
p).  The 
bracketed expression in the definition of Λ is the gap between this maximized difference 




p ∈    !
p  as the population’s current mixed 
strategy.  Theorem 3.1 shows that the weighted sum of these gaps over all populations 
decreases  under  the  dynamic  (P).    This  sum  is  zero  precisely  when  all  populations 
maximize the difference between aggregate payoffs and control costs; the lone state 
where this occurs is the unique perturbed equilibrium of (F, ν). 
 –12– 
3.2  Potential Games 
 
  We call the game F a potential game if it satisfies  
 
 (ES)   








p (x) for all i ∈    S
p, j ∈    S
q, p, q ∈ P, and x ∈ X. 
 
This requirement is stated more concisely as 
 
       DF(x) is symmetric for all x ∈ X. 
 
Condition (ES) is called externality symmetry.  It requires that the effect on the payoffs to 
strategy j ∈    S
q of introducing new players choosing strategy i ∈    S
p is always equals the 
effect  on  the  payoffs  to  strategy  i  of  introducing  new  players  choosing  strategy  j.  
Random matching games in which all players in a match receive the same payoff are 
potential games.  More interesting examples arise in nonlinear settings:  all congestion 
games  are  potential  games,  as  are  games  generated  by  certain  marginal  externality 
pricing schemes.  For further details on these examples, see Sandholm [35, 38]. 
   Since the derivative of F is symmetric, every potential game F admits a potential 
function f:    X  → R:  that is, a function that satisfies       !f(x) = F(x) for all x ∈ X.  Hofbauer 
[22] and Sandholm [35] show that this potential function serves as a Lyapunov function 
for a wide range of unperturbed evolutionary dynamics, and so can be used to establish 
global  convergence  results.    To  obtain  a  Lyapunov  function  for  the  perturbed  best 
response dynamics, one need only perturb the potential function by the deterministic 
perturbations    V
p.  Define 
 
       Π(x) = f(x) – 







p!P " . 
 
Theorem 3.2:  If F is a potential game and ν is admissible, then 
   (i)    Π is an (increasing) strict Lyapunov function for the dynamic (P). 
   (ii)   All solution trajectories of (P) converge to connected subsets of PE(F, ν), and PE(F, 
ν) = {x ∈ X:  x is a critical point of Π}.  If PE(F, ν) is a singleton it is globally asymptotically 
stable. 
 –13– 
3.3  Supermodular Games. 
 
   We say that F is a supermodular game if it satisfies 
 
   (SC)  
     
!(Fi+1





(x) ≥ 0 for all i <    n
p , j <    n
q, p, q ∈ P, and x ∈ X. 
 
When expanded, the leading inequality in this condition becomes 
 
      








q (x) ≥ 










We  call  condition  (SC)  strategic  complementarity.    It  states  that  if  some  players  in 
population q switch from strategy j to strategy j + 1, the performance of strategy i + 1 ∈ 
   S
p  improves  relative  to  that  of  strategy  i.    This  condition  is  an  infinite  player 
generalization of conditions for finite player games studied by Topkis [40], Vives [42], 
and Milgrom and Roberts [31]. These papers provide many microeconomic applications 
of  supermodular  games,  while  Cooper  [13]  offers  a  number  of  macroeconomic 
applications. 
   It is easiest to study perturbed best response dynamics for supermodular games 
after applying a change of coordinates.  Define the linear operator    T
p:    X
p →          R
n
p !1 by 
 
       (   T
px
p)i = 








If we view    x
p as a discrete density function on the set of pure strategies    S
p = {1, … ,    n
p } 
with total mass    m
p, then    T
p
   x
p is the corresponding decumulative distribution function.  
Hence,     z
p   stochastically  dominates     x
p  if  and  only  if     T
p
   z
p   ≥     T
p
   x
p.    To  compare 
complete population states, we let Tx = (      T
1x
1, … ,     T
p x
p ).   
   Our  goal  is  to  show  that  when  F  is  supermodular,  the  dynamic  (P)  is  strongly 
monotone with respect to the stochastic dominance order:   if {xt}t≥0 and {zt}t≥0 are two solutions 
to (P) with Tz0 ≥ Tx0 and z0 ≠ x0, then Tzt > Txt for all t > 0.  Doing so is valuable because 
as we shall see, strongly monotone dynamics have appealing convergence properties. 
   To establish strong monotonicity, we require a mild additional assumption on the 
game F.  Let       ˆ  S  = {(k, p):  k ∈    S
p – {   n
p }, p ∈ P}.  We say that the supermodular game F is 
irreducible if for all states x ∈ X and all nonempty proper subsets K of       ˆ  S , there exist a 
pair (k, p) ∈ K, a strategy i ∈    S
p – {   n
p }, and a pair (j, q) ∈       ˆ  S  – K such that condition (SC) 
holds strictly at x for the pairs (i, p) and (j, q).  Under this condition, a movement of –14– 
mass from strategy j ∈    S
q to strategy j + 1 strictly improves the relative performance of 
some strategy belonging to the same population as strategy k.
5  
   Theorem  3.3  shows  that  if  F  is  supermodular  and  irreducible,  then  almost  all 
solution  trajectories  of  perturbed  best  response  dynamics  converge  to  perturbed 
equilibria. 
 
Theorem 3.3:  If F is an irreducible supermodular game and ν is admissible, then the dynamic 
(P) is strongly monotone with respect to the stochastic dominance order.  Hence, there is an 
open, dense, full measure set of initial conditions from which solutions to (P) converge to single 
points in PE(F, ν).  If PE(F, ν) is a singleton it is globally asymptotically stable. 
 
   The constructions used in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 show that these results hold not only 
for perturbed best response dynamics based on stochastic payoff perturbations, but also 
for dynamics based on deterministic perturbations.  In contrast, Theorem 3.3 cannot be 
extended to all perturbed best response dynamics based on deterministic perturbations, 
as the extra structure provided by the stochastic perturbations is needed to establish the 
monotonicity of the dynamics. 
 
4.  Convergence Theorems 
 
  In  this  section,  we  use  the  prededing  analysis  to  prove  two  sets  of  convergence 
results for the Markov processes    Xt
N .  The first set, described in Theorem 4.1, shows 
that over finite time horizons, in the three classes of games studied above, the process 
   Xt
N  converges to the set of perturbed equilibria.  The second set, stated in Theorem 4.2, 
demonstrates that over the infinite time horizon,    Xt
N  converges to the set of Lyapunov 
stable equilibria.  While the medium analysis is simpler, the long run results evidently 
offer  a  more refined  prediction  of  play.    However,  we  shall  see  that  the  notions  of 
convergence used in each case differ in subtle but important ways, lending each set of 
results its own unique appeal. 
 
                                                 
5    Irreducibility  is  a  weaker  assumption  than  strict  supermodularity,  the  assumption  utilized  in 
Hofbauer and Sandholm [25] in the context of normal form games. –15– 
4.1  Convergence in the Medium Run 
 
  To state our finite horizon convergence result, we consider a sequence of Markov 
processes    Xt
N  whose initial conditions       X0
N  ∈       X
N converge to some state x0 ∈ X as the 
population  size  N  approaches  infinity.    We  say  that  these  processes  converge  in  the 
medium run to the closed set A ! X from the initial condition x0 if for each open set O 
containing A, there is a time T0 = T0(x0) such that for all T ≥ T0, 
 
      




N #O for allt #[T0,T] ( ) = 1. 
 
In words:  if a large group of players begins play near x0, then with probability close to 
1, their behavior approaches the set A and remains nearby for a long, finite time span.  
We say that convergence is uniform if the time T0 that the neighborhood of A is reached 
can be chosen independently of the initial condition x0 ∈ X. 
 
Theorem 4.1.  Consider stochastic evolution in the game F under the admissible disturbance 
distributions    !
p . 
   (i)    If F is a stable game, then    Xt
N  converges in the medium run to the singleton PE(F, ν) 
from every initial condition x0 ∈ X. 
   (ii)   If F is a potential game, then    Xt
N  converges in the medium run to a connected subset 
of PE(F, ν) from every initial condition x0 ∈ X. 
   (iii)  If F is an irreducible supermodular game, then    Xt
N  converges in the medium run to 
an element of PE(F, ν) from an open, dense, full measure set of initial conditions x0 ∈ X. 
   In all cases, convergence is uniform whenever PE(F, ν) is a singleton. 
 
   The proof of the theorem is based on an analogue of the law of large numbers for 
sequences  of  Markov  chains  that  has  been  studied  in  game  theoretic  contexts  by 
Binmore  and  Samuelson  [8],  Sandholm  [36],  and  Benaïm  and  Weibull  [7].    It  is 
presented in the Appendix. 
 
4.2  Convergence in the Long Run 
 
   Theorem 4.1 cannot be extended to an infinite horizon result (T = ∞):  since the 
process    Xt
N  is irreducible, all states in       X
N are visited infinitely often with probability 
one, and so large deviations from all rest points are certain to occur.  But it is precisely 
this fact that enables us to obtain tighter predictions of behavior over this time span.  –16– 
While all states are visited and abandoned infinitely often, one expects that only states 
near attractors of (P) will be visited with nonvanishing frequency.  This observation is 
the basis for our infinite horizon convergence results. 
  We formally characterize infinite horizon behavior using the stationary distribution 
   µ
N of the process    Xt
N .  Since    Xt
N  is irreducible and aperiodic, the stationary distribution 
is  unique,  and  it  describes  the  long  run  behavior  of     Xt
N   in  two  distinct  ways.
6  
Regardless of initial behavior,    µ
N approximates the probability distribution of    Xt
N  after 
a long enough time has passed: 
 
      





N ( ) =    µ
N(A)  for all       x0
N  ∈    X
N . 
 
More importantly,    µ
N also describes the limiting time average of play: 
 
      












N ( ) = 1. 
 
   Our  notion  of  infinite  horizon  convergence  is  defined  in  terms  of  the  stationary 
distributions    µ
N. We say that the processes    Xt
N  converge in the long run to the closed set 
A ! X if for each open set O containing A, we have that 
 
      
     
lim
N!"µ
N(O) = 1. 
 
   Our two notions of convergence differ not only in terms the time horizons under 
consideration, but also in terms  of the fixedness of behavior at  the predicted set A.  
Under medium horizon convergence, after the time T0 at which a neighborhood of A is 
reached, the process    Xt
N  may not leave this neighborhood for a long, finite span.  This 
form of convergence is appealing because of its stringency.  However, the time scale on 
which this notion  of convergence is useful is one that does not allow us to discard 
unstable rest points of (P).   
   By considering infinite horizon behavior, we are able to use the randomness of the 
process    Xt
N  to rule out unstable rest points.  But the time scale that permits unstable rest 
points  to  be  abandoned  is  also  one  on  which  convergence  to  stable  rest  points  is 
temporary.    This  relative  weakness  is  embodied  in  our  convergence  criterion.    By 
defining our notion of long run convergence in terms of the stationary distributions    µ
N, 
we  concern  ourselves  with  the  time  average  of  play.    In  doing  so,  we  allow  for 
                                                 
6    For more on these properties, see, e.g., Durrett [15]. –17– 
departures  from  the  predicted  set  A,  so  long  as  these  departures  are  sufficiently 
uncommon.   
  To state Theorem 4.2, we recall that the rest point x* ∈ PE(F, ν) is Lyapunov stable if 
for  each  neighborhood  O  of  x*,  there  is  another  neighborhood  Q  of  x*  such  that 
solutions to (P) that begin in Q remain in O for all positive times.  Let LS(F, ν) ! PE(F, ν) 
denote the set of Lyapunov stable rest points of (P). 
 
Theorem 4.2:  Consider stochastic evolution in the game F under the admissible disturbance 
distributions    !
p . 
   (i)    Suppose that F is a stable game.  Then    Xt
N  converges in the long run to the singleton 
PE(F, ν) = LS(F, ν). 
   (ii)   Suppose that F is a potential game and that PE(F, ν) is finite.  Then    Xt
N  converges in 
the long run to LS(F, ν). 
   (iii)Suppose that F is an irreducible supermodular game. Then    Xt
N  converges in the long run 
to LS(F, ν). 
 
  Part (i) of the theorem shows that if F is a stable game, then in the long run a large 
population is nearly always in a neighborhood of the unique perturbed equilibrium of 
(F,  ν).    Part  (ii)  shows  that  if  F  is  a  potential  game,  then  under  a  mild  regularity 
condition, the population only stays near Lyapunov stable rest points of (P).  Part (iii) 
shows that this conclusion also holds if F is supermodular and irreducible.
7  The proof 
of  the  theorem,  which  combines  our  earlier  analysis  with  stochastic  approximation 
results due to Benaïm [2] and Benaïm and Hirsch [6], is provided in the Appendix.
8 
 
                                                 
7    Benaïm and Hirsch [6] establish this last result for the case of normal form supermodular games with 
exactly two strategies per player. 
8    It is worth noting that our convergence results, in particular our results for supermodular games, 
impose no restrictions on the number of strategies in the underlying game.  In Hofbauer and Sandholm 
[25], our convergence theorem for stochastic fictitious play in normal form supermodular games requires 
the dimension of the state space to be no greater than 2.  However, if a conjecture of Benaïm [4] is correct 
this dimensionality condition is actually not needed to establish convergence. –18– 
5.  Contrasting Stochastic Evolution and Stochastic Fictitious Play 
 
   We conclude the paper by contrasting the stochastic evolutionary process studied 
here with stochastic fictitious play.  In standard fictitious play (Brown [11]), a group of 
players repeatedly plays a normal form game.  In every period, each player chooses a 
best  response  to  his  beliefs,  which  are  given  by  the  time  average  of  past  play.    In 
stochastic fictitious play (Fudenberg and Kreps [17]), best responses are chosen after 
each player's payoffs are randomly perturbed.  Like the process considered above, the 
expected motion of stochastic fictitious play is described by the perturbed best response 
dynamic (P).  Using this observation, Fudenberg and Kreps [17], Kaniovski and Young 
[29] and Benaïm and Hirsch [5] prove that stochastic fictitious play converges in 2 x 2 
games,  while  Hofbauer  and  Sandholm  [25] establish  convergence  in  games  with  an 
interior ESS, zero-sum games, potential games, and certain supermodular games. 
   While  stochastic  fictitious  play  is  model  of  behavior  in  normal  form  games, 
stochastic evolution can be used to model behavior in any population game, allowing 
us to establish convergence results in a broader class of strategic settings.  For example, 
in  settings  with  two  player  roles,  stochastic  fictitious  play  converges  to  an  interior 
equilibrium only in games that are essentially zero-sum (Hofbauer and Hopkins [24]).  
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 show that in the evolutionary model, such convergence occurs in 
all stable games whose Nash equilibria are not on the boundary of the state space; these 
include, for example, games used to model highway congestion. 
   The most important differences between the two models lie in the definitions of their 
state variables and in the limits taken in establishing convergence results.  The state 
variable of stochastic fictitious play is the time average of past play, so the increment in 
the state at time t is of size      
1
t .  Because these increments become vanishingly small, one 
can  obtain  convergence  results  by  simply  studying  the  limit  behavior  of  the  state 
variable  as  t  grows  large.    In  contrast,  the  state  variable  under  stochastic  evolution 
describes the proportions of players choosing each strategy, so the increments of the 
state are of fixed size      
1
N .  Since the state space of the process is a finite grid for each 
fixed value of N, proving convergence to perturbed equilibrium requires us to consider 
limits as the population size grows large.  Because limits are taken in N rather than in t, 
it is possible to prove separate limit results for finite and infinite time horizons. 
   These distinguishing features also underlie a more subtle difference between the two 
processes.  Suppose that the dynamic (P) has the phase diagram in Figure 1, flowing –19– 
clockwise around a circle except at a single rest point.
9  Then the expected motions of 





Figure 1:  A deterministic flow. 
 
  Under stochastic fictitious play, the state variable is the time average of past play.  
Here it proceeds clockwise on average, but moves quite slowly near the top of the circle.  
When the rest point is reached, the expected change in the state is zero, but since the 
actual increments are stochastic, the process eventually clears the rest point and begins 
another circuit.  Consequently, while time averaged behavior under stochastic fictitious 
play can in principle converge to a single limit point, in this case the set of limit points is 
the entire state space.   
   Under stochastic evolution, the state represents the current proportions of players 
choosing  each  strategy,  and  this  too  perpetually  rounds  the  circle.    Because  the 
evolutionary process is ergodic, convergence to a single limit point is impossible even in 
principle.    Therefore,  when  studying  long  run  behavior,  we  examine  the  stationary 
distribution  of  the  process,  which  describes  its  limiting  time  average.    Since  the 
expected motion of the process becomes vanishingly slow only in a neighborhood of the 
rest point, in the long run the time average of play is concentrated entirely on this 
segment. 
  This difference in the strength of the convergence results is due to a reversal in the 
order  of  two  operations:    time  averaging  and  deterministic  approximation.    Under 
stochastic fictitious play, the state variable is defined as the time average of play, and 
                                                 
9    Of course, the state space of (P) cannot be a circle,  but pretending  this is possible simplifies  our 
discussion. –20– 
the  dynamics  of  the  time  average  are  studied  using  a  deterministic  approximation.  
Under stochastic evolution, the state variable represents current behavior, the evolution 
of which is analyzed through a deterministic approximation, and only after this is a 
time average taken to describe long run play. 
   This  distinction  is  reflected  in  the  different  notions  of  recurrence  applied  to  the 
dynamic (P) when analyzing the two models.  Benaïm and Hirsch [5] show that the 
limiting time average of stochastic fictitious play lies in the chain recurrent set of (P), a set 
containing those states that can occur repeatedly if the flow of (P) is subjected to small 
shocks at isolated points in time.  In contrast, Benaïm and Weibull [7] show that the 
limiting  stationary  distribution  under  stochastic  evolution  is  concentrated  on  the 
minimal center of attraction of (P).
10  The chain recurrent set always contains the minimal 
center of attraction, and the example above shows that this inclusion can be strict.  Thus, 
the  basic  prediction  generated  by  the  stochastic  evolution  model  is  finer  than  that 




  We begin by reviewing the discrete choice characterization theorem from Hofbauer 
and Sandholm [25].  Define the choice probability function    C
p:       R
n
p
 →    !
p  in terms of 
admissible distribution    !
p , as in equation (1): 
 
             Ci
p(!
p) = 
     
!
p "
p : i #argmaxj#Sp $ j
p + " j
p ( ). 
 
We now summarize a number of properties of this function and provide an explicit 
formula for its deterministic representation (2). 
 
(P1)           Ci
p(!
p + "1) =       Ci
p(!
p) for all    !
p  ∈       R
n
p
 and λ ∈ R. 
(P2)  For all    !
p  ∈       R
n
p
,       DC
p(!
p) is symmetric, has positive diagonal elements  
       and negative off-diagonal elements, and has rows and columns  
       that sum to zero. 
(P3)      C
p admits a potential function    W
p :       R
n
p
 → R (i.e., a function satisfying 
             C
p(!
p) !        !W
p("




(P4)   Let    V
p: int(   !
p ) → R be the Legendre transform of    W
p :          R0
n
p
 → R: 
                                                 
10    The minimal center of attraction is closure of the union of the supports of all probability measures on 
X that are invariant under (P).  This set is contained in (and often identical to) the more easily computed 
Birkhoff center, which is the closure of the set of recurrent points of (P).  For more on notions of recurrence 
for  deterministic  flows,  see  Nemytskii  and  Stepanov  [33],  Conley  [12],  Akin  [1],  Robinson  [34],  and 
Benaïm [2, 3]. –21– 
 
             V
p(y
p) = 








p) ( ). 
 
     Then    V
p is an admissible deterministic perturbation that satisfies 
 
             W
p(!
p) = 
     
max




p) ( ) and 
             C
p(!
p) = 









p) ( ) 
 
     for all    !
p  ∈          R0
n
p
, and    !V
p: int(   !
p ) →          R0
n
p
 is the inverse of    C
p:          R0
n
p
 →  int(   !
p ). 
 
  To prove Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, it is convenient to define the virtual payoffs for the 
pair (F, ν) by 
 
            ˆ  F 
p(x) =       F







where    V
p is the deterministic perturbation corresponding to    !
p .  The next two lemmas 
provide two justifications for this definition.   
   The  proofs  of  these  lemmas  require  two  additional  definitions.    Let        F 
p(x)  = 






p "  denote the average payoff obtained by population p strategies, and let 
      ˜  F 
p(x) =       F
p(x) –       F 
p(x)1 ∈          R0
n
p
 be a normalized version of the payoff vector       F
p(x). 
    The first lemma shows that perturbed equilibria are those states that equalize virtual 
payoffs in each population. 
 
Lemma A.1:  x ∈ PE(F, ν) if and only if      ˆ  F 
p(x) =    c
p1 for some    c
p ∈ R and all p ∈ P. 
 
   Proof:  Observe that by properties (P1) and (P4), 
 
         x ∈ PE(F, ν)  ⇔    x
p =    m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) for all p ∈ P 
               ⇔    x
p =    m
p
      C
p(F
p(x)) for all p ∈ P 
               ⇔    x
p =    m
p
         C
p(F
p(x)! F 
p(x)1) for all p ∈ P   





p) =       F
p(x) –       F 
p(x)1 for all p ∈ P   
               ⇔      ˆ  F 
p(x) =       F 
p(x)1 for all p ∈ P. 
 
This  establishes  the  "only  if"  direction.    To  prove  the  "if"  direction,  note  that  since 





p) ∈          R0
n
p
 by property (P4), 1 ·      ˆ  F 
p(x) = 1 · F(x).  Therefore, if      ˆ  F 
p(x) =    c
p1, then 
1 · F(x) = 1 ·      ˆ  F 
p(x) =    c
p
   n
p , and so    c
p =       F 
p(x).  Thus, the "if" direction follows from the 
equivalence derived above.  ■ –22– 
 
   In  settings  without  perturbations,  one  appealing  monotonicity  property  for 
evolutionary  dynamics  requires  that  each  population's  direction  of  motion  always 
forms an acute angle with its payoff vector:  in other words, that       ˙  x 
p !F
p(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ 
X.  Sandholm [38] calls this condition positive correlation.  The next lemma, first proved 
by Hofbauer [22] for a single population setting, establishes a corresponding property 
for the perturbed best response dynamics expressed in terms of virtual payoffs.  We use 
the properties listed above to provide a simple proof. 
 
Lemma A.2:  (   m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) –    x
p) ·      ˆ  F 
p(x) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ P and x ∈ X, with equality only if 
   m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) =    x
p. 
 
   Proof:  Since    m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) –    x
p is a direction of motion through    X
p, (   m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) –    x
p) · 1 = 0.  
Also, note that    y
p  ≡       ˜  B 
p(x) =       C
p(F
p(x)) =       C
p( ˜  F 
p(x)) by property (P1), so property (P4) 
implies that       !V
p(y
p) =       ˜  F 
p(x).  Using these observations in turn, we find that 
 
       (   m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) –    x
p) ·      ˆ  F 
p(x) = (   m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) –    x
p) · (      F






  = (   m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) –    x
p) · (      ˜  F 






   =    m
p(   y
p  –      
1
m
p    x
p) · (      !V
p(y







which is positive by the strict convexity of    V
p, strictly so unless    m
p
      ˜  B 
p(x) =    x
p.  ■ 
 
The Proof of Theorem 3.1 
   We first prove part (i).  Properties (P3) and (P2) and the definition of       ˜  B 
p imply that 
along any solution of (P), 
 
            ˙  ! (x) = 
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p#P $  
         = 





p(x) ˙  x # x
p "DF
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p) ( ) ( )
p$P %  
         = 
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p(x) ! x
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p$P %  
        = 
        
˙  x 
p !DF
p(x) ˙  x " ˙  x 
p ! ˆ  F 
p(x) ( )
p#P $  
         = 
        
˙  x !DF(x) ˙  x " (m
p ˜  B 
p(x)" x
p)! ˆ  F 
p(x)
p#P $  
 –23– 
The first term of the last expression is negative by condition (SE); the second term is 
negative by Lemma A.2, strictly so only if x is a rest point of (P).  This establishes part (i) 
of the theorem. 
   We now prove part (ii).  First, standard results (e.g., Theorem 7.6 of Hofbauer and 
Sigmund  [26])  tell  us  that  since  (P)  admits  a  strict  Lyapunov  function,  all  solution 
trajectories of (P) converge to connected sets of rest points of (P).  By definition, these 
rest points are the perturbed equilibria of (F, ν).  Moreover, Lemma A.1 and property 
(P4) imply that 
 





p) =       F
p(x) +    c
p1  for all p ∈ P 
         ⇔      
1
m
p    x
p = 









p) ( )  for all p ∈ P 
         ⇔ Λ(x) = 0. 
 
   It remains to show that PE(F, ν) is a singleton.  For each x ∈ X and h ∈ TX, define 
 
            
ˆ  f  x ,h(t) = h ·      
ˆ  F  (x + th) 
 
for all t such that x + th ∈ X.  Since F is stable and each    V
p is differentiably strictly 
convex, we find that 
 
            
ˆ  !  f  x ,h(t) =       h!Dˆ  F  (x + th)h =       h!DF(x + th)h – 











p"P #  < 0. 
 
Thus,      
ˆ  f  x ,h(t) is decreasing in t. 
   If x ∈ PE(F, ν), then Lemma A.1 implies that      
ˆ  f  x ,h(0) = h ·      ˆ  F  (x) = 0 for all h ∈ TX.  Now 
let y be a state in X distinct from x, so that y = x + tyhy for some ty > 0 and nonzero hy ∈ 
TX.  Then hy ·      
ˆ  F  (y) = hy ·      
ˆ  F  (x + tyhy) = 
     
ˆ  f  x ,hy (ty) < 0, and so y cannot be in PE(F, ν).  We 
therefore conclude that PE(F, ν) is a singleton containing the unique state at which Λ 
equals zero, and that this state is globally asymptotically stable under (P).  ■ 
 
The Proof of Theorem 3.2 
   Condition (ES) implies that along solutions of (P), 
 
           ˙  ! (x)  =       !f(x)" ˙  x  – 





p)" ˙  x 
p
p#P $  
          = 






p) ( )# ˙  x 
p
p$P %  –24– 
           = 
        
ˆ  F 
p(x)! ˙  x 
p
p"P #  
 
By Lemma A.2, this expression is positive and equals zero only at rest points of (P).  
Hence, Π is a strict Lyapunov function for (P), implying global convergence of solution 
trajectories of (P) to connected subsets of x ∈ PE(F, ε).  Finally, Lemma A.1 tells us that 
 
       x is a critical point of Π in X  ⇔       F
p(x) –    c





p) for all p ∈ P 
                          ⇔ x ∈ PE(F, ε).  ■ 
 
The Proof of Theorem 3.3 
   It is useful to study the dynamic (P) after applying the change of variable T.  To do 
so, we let    T
p[   X
p] = {   v
p ∈          R
n
p !1:     m
p ≥       v1
p ≥ … ≥       vn
p !1
p  ≥ 0}, so that T[X] = 




p !  is 
the  transformation  of  the  state  space  X  by  T.    Note  that  if  v  ∈  T[X],  the  set  of 
components of v is       ˆ  S .  If we then define       ˆ  B 
p: T[X] →    T
p[   !
p ] by       ˆ  B 
p(v) =       T
p˜  B 
p(T
!1v), the 
transformed dynamic is given by 
 
(T)           ˙  v 
p =    m
p




One can verify (P) and (T) are linearly conjugate:  {xt}t≥0 solves (P) if and only if {Txt}t≥0 
solves (T). 
   Our  goal  is  to  show  that  the  dynamic  (T)  is  cooperative  and  irreducible.    A 





q (v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ T[X] 
and all distinct pairs (k, p), (j, q) ∈       ˆ  S .  The equation is irreducible if for each v ∈ T[X] and 





q (v) ≠ 0.  Theorem 4.1.1 of Smith [39] shows that the flow of a cooperative irreducible 
dynamic is strongly monotone with respect to the standard vector order.  Thus, if (T) is 
cooperative and irreducible, our first claim follows from this result and the conjugacy of 
(P) and (T), the second claim follows in turn from Theorem 2.4.7 of Smith [39] and 
Theorem 1.1 of Hirsch [20], and the third claim is proved as follows:  Suppose that x* is 
the  unique  perturbed  equilibrium  of  (F,  ν).    Then  if  x  and     x   are  the  minimal  and 
maximal points in X, Theorem 1.2.1 of Smith [39] implies that the solutions to (P) from 
these  points  converge  to  rest  points,  and  hence  to  x*.    Thus, for  any  x  ∈  X,  strong 
monotonicity implies that at all times t, the solutions to (P) starting from x, x, and    x  are 
ranked by T.  Therefore, the solution to (P) from x must also converge to x*, and x* is 
Lyapunov stable. –25– 
  We now show that (T) is cooperative and irreducible.  Fix v ∈ T[X], and let x =       T
!1v 
∈ X.  Since       B
p(x) =       C
p(F
p(x)), the off-diagonal elements of the derivative matrix for (T) 
are given by 
     
m
p ! ˆ  B  k
p
! v j
q (v), where 
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p
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where the last equality follows from the fact that 
 
      




!  = 














for any pair of vectors f, c ∈       R
n
p
.  Property (P2) implies that the first expression in 
brackets is zero and that the second expression in brackets is strictly negative for all h < 
   n
p  and equals zero if h =    n
p .  Furthermore, condition (SC) implies that the directional 
derivative from the second term is always positive.  Thus, 
     
m
p ! ˆ  B  k
p
! v j
q (v) ≥ 0 for all distinct 
pairs (α, k), (β, j) ∈       ˆ  S , and so (T) is cooperative.   
   To show that (T) is irreducible, fix a nonempty proper subset K of       ˆ  S .  Since F is 
irreducible by assumption, there exist a pair (k, p) ∈ K, a strategy h ∈    S
p – {   n
p }, and a 
pair (j, q) ∈       ˆ  S  – K such that 






q ) (x) > 0.  Hence, the reasoning above implies that 
     
m
p ! ˆ  B  k
p
! v j
q (v) > 0, so (T) is irreducible.  This completes the proof of the theorem.  ■ 
 
The Proof of Theorem 4.1 
   Theorem 4.1 of Sandholm [36], based on results of Kurtz [30], shows that over any 
finite horizon, the stochastic process    Xt
N  stays within   
!
2  of the solution trajectory of (P) 
with the same initial condition with probability close to 1 when N is large.  Theorems 
3.1  and  3.2  show  that  in  the  games  considered  in  parts  (i)  and  (ii),  all  solution 
trajectories of (P) converge to PE(F, ν); Theorem 3.3 shows that in supermodular games, –26– 
this is true of trajectories starting from almost every initial condition.  Combining these 
results proves parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of the theorem. 
    To prove the final claim, suppose that F has a unique equilibrium.  Theorems 3.1, 
3.2, and 3.3 imply that for our three classes of games, a unique equilibrium is globally 
asymptotically  stable.    The  final  claim  then  follows  from  this  classical  result  from 
dynamical systems. 
 
Lemma A.3:  Let x* be globally asymptotically stable the flow φ on the compact set X.  Fix γ > 
0, and let τ(x) = inf{T:       !(t,x)" x*  ≤ γ for all t ≥ T}.  Then supx∈X τ(x) < ∞. 
 
  Proof:  Since x* is globally asymptotically stable, τ(x) < ∞ for all x ∈ X.  Now suppose 
that the lemma is false.  Then there is a sequence of initial conditions {   x
k} ! X such that 
limk→∞τ(   x
k) = ∞.  Since X is compact, this sequence has an accumulation point    x  ∈ X.  
Because  x*  is  Lyapunov  stable,  there  is  an  η  >  0  such  that  whenever       x ! x*   ≤  η, 
     !(t,x)" x*  ≤ γ for all t ≥ 0.  Because x* is a global attractor, there is a time    T  < ∞ such 
that      !(T ,x )" x*  ≤   
!
2 .  Finally, since the flow is continuous in the initial condition x, we 
know  that  for  all  x  sufficiently  close  to    x ,       !(T ,x)" !(T ,x )  ≤    
!
2 .    Therefore, for  all 
sufficiently large k, the triangle inequality implies that      !(T ,x
k)" x*  ≤ η, and hence that 
     !(t,x
k)" x*  ≤ γ for all t ≥    T .  But then τ(   x
k) ≤    T  for all sufficiently large k, contradicting 
the definition of the sequence {   x
k}.  ❏ 
 
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.  ■ 
 –27– 
The Proof of Theorem 4.2 
   The proof of parts (i) and (ii) rely on results from Benaïm [2] (hereafter B98).  One 
can verify that Hypotheses 2.1, 2.3, and 3.4 of B98 are all satisfied (cf. B98 Example 1.1).  
Thus, part (i) of theorem follows directly from B98 Corollary 3.2 and our Theorem 3.1 
(in particular, from the fact that the lone element of PE(F, ν) is the unique ω-limit point 
of (P)). 
   The proof of part (ii) utilizes B98 Theorem 4.3.  Condition (i) of this theorem follows 
from Proposition 3.2 and the finiteness of PE(F, ν).  Condition (ii) follows from B98 
Remark 3.10 (iii) and the fact that all rest points of (P) are in int(X).  Condition (iii) 
follows from the fact that    Xt
N  is defined on X.  Finally, since PE(F, ν) is finite, and since 
by our Theorem 3.2 (P) is gradient-like, the discussion on p.69 of B98 implies that the 
weakly  stable  equilibria  are  those  that  coincide  with  their  own  unstable  manifolds; 
these are simply the local maximizers of Π, or equivalently the Lyapunov stable rest 
points LS(F, ν).  This completes the proof of part (ii) of the theorem. 
   We now turn to the proof of part (iii).  To begin, we establish a nondegeneracy 
condition on the motions of    Xt
N .  For each x ∈ X, let    !
x be a random vector that is 
defined  on  an  arbitrary  probability  space  Ω  and  that  describes  the  normalized 
increments of the process    Xt
N  from state x.  The distribution of    !
x is described by 
 
      P(   !
x =    ej
p –    ei
p) =      
1
m       xi
p ˜  B  j
p(x) whenever i, j ∈    S
p, i ≠ j and p ∈ P; 
      P(   !
x = 0) = 
        
1
m xi




p!P " . 
 
Let     !
x  ∈        R
n!n  denote  the  covariance  matrix  of     !
x.    Since     !
x  is  symmetric,  its 
eigenvalues  are  real.    Let    !
x  be  the  smallest  eigenvalue  of    !
x  corresponding  to  an 
eigenvector in TX.  (One can show that the remaining eigenvectors are orthogonal to TX 
and have eigenvalues of zero.)  We want to show that    !
x is uniformly bounded away 
from zero.  Intuitively, this means that for  any current state x and any direction of 
motion z in TX, the amount of randomness in the motion of the process    Xt
N  in the 
direction z is nonnegligible. 
  To establish the bound on    !
x, we let 
 
      β ≡ 






˜  B  i
p(x) > 0. 
 
Lemma A.4:  For all x ∈ X, the minimum eigenvalue    !




  Proof:  Since    !
x is symmetric, we know that if θ ∈ TX is a unit length eigenvector of 
   !
x,  the  corresponding  eigenvalue is  θ·   !
xθ  =  Var(θ ·   !
x).    It  is  therefore  sufficient  to 
bound Var(θ ·   !
x) for all unit length θ ∈ TX. 
   Partition  the  probability  space  Ω  into  events     I
p,  where     I
p  is  the  event  that  the 





m , and all realizations of    !
x involving nonzero increments for population p occur on 
   I
p.  Letting    y




p, we note the following conditional probabilities and expectations: 
 






p ( ) =       yi
p ˜  B  j
p(x)             if i ≠ j ; 






p ( ) = 0                 if i ≠ j and q ≠ p; 
     
     
P !
x = 0I
p ( ) = 
     
yi
p ˜  B  i
p(x)
i!S
p " ; 
     
     
E !i
x,p I
p ( ) =      
˜  B  i
p(x)! yi
p; 
      




p ( ) =       !yi
p ˜  B  i
p(x)! yj
p ˜  B  j
p(x)         if i ≠ j; 
      




p ( ) =       yi
p(1! ˜  B  i
p(x))+(1! yi
p)˜  B  i
p(x); 
      




p ( ) =       ! ˜  B  i
p(x)˜  B  j
p(x)! yi
pyj
p        if i ≠ j; 
      
     
Var !i
x ,p I








   Fix a unit length θ ∈ TX, and let F be the σ-algebra generated by the events    I
p.  A 
standard decomposition of variance (see, e.g., Durrett [15]) yields 
 
       Var(θ ·   !
x)  = 
     
E Var! "#
x F [ ] [ ] + 
     
Var E ! "#
x F [ ] [ ] 
         ≥ 
     
E Var! "#
x F [ ] [ ] 
         = 
     
mp
m
p!P " Var # $%
x I
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         = 
        
mp
m
p!P " Var #
p $%
x,p I
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p ( ) = 0 for q ≠ p.  Since 
   y
p  and       ˜  B 
p(x) lie in the simplex    !
p  and since    !i
p
i"S
p #  = 0 for all p (because θ ∈ TX), we 
can use the conditional probabilities and expectations above to compute that 
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Since each    m
p is a positive integer and since 




i"Sp # p"P #  = 1, we conclude that 
 
       Var(θ ·   !
x) ≥ 







p #  ≥   
!
m .  ❏ 
 
  Now, if we can show that the conditions supporting Theorem 1.5 of Benaïm and 
Hirsch [6] (henceforth BH) hold, part (iii) of our theorem immediately follows.  The 
proof of Theorem 3.3 shows that after a linear transformation, the dynamics (P) form a 
cooperative,  irreducible  dynamical  system  on  X,  so  BH  Hypothesis  1.2  is  satisfied.  
Since the increments are uniformly bounded above, and since    !
x is uniformly bounded 
below  by  Lemma  A.4,  BH  Proposition  2.3  implies  that  BH  Hypothesis  1.4  holds.  
Finally, since each    Xt
N  takes values in the compact set X, the tightness assumption in 
BH Theorem 1.5 is satisfied.  Therefore, BH Theorem 1.5 implies that limN→∞   µ
N(O) = 1 
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